THE LESS
EVIDENT EVENTS
THAT PRECEDED IN 490 BC
THE BATTLE OF MARATHON
By dr. of anthropology N. A. Poulianos
Hellenic
P.R Director
1. Few
months prior to the famous battle of Marathon, a Medean (i.e. Persian) armada of
~600 ships had sailed from the central Asia Minor against
the southern Greek mainland. The
Persian justifications referred to the punishment of the cities
of Athens and Eretria for their military support provided
during the Ionian Revolution (499-494 BC) to the Hellenes (i.e. Greeks) that
were living then on the coasts of the today Turkey (Greeks that however
genetically continue to survive there till our times). The above referred Persian justifications were soon revealed to be nothing but pretences, since the Medean campaign
began by the conquest of many
islands of the Aegean See. Thus, it was since the beginning evident that the
goal of Medeans was not just the punishment
of Eretria and Athens, but also the gaining of extra lands and wealth (by lootings,
enslavements etc). An equally important purpose of
this campaign (if not the most important one) was the annihilation of the
(anyway) more democratic Hellenic cities that existed to the western border of
the Persian Empire, since such a "bad" political example could not be
tolerated by its par excellence monarchic leadership and the unique superpower
of the epoch. At the same time Medeans also pursued
at keeping uneventful the Iones (Yunans
as are named Hellenes in most oriental languages, Turkish included most
probably due to the outcome of Marathon battle), along with the other
subordinated peoples of the Persian Empire, in order to be clear everybody that
the Medeans were holding the “upper hand”. Consequently, a target
was also the Greeks living to the west of Asia Minor, so that not even them
could assist again their compatriots and / or other ethnicities incorporated
into the Persian Empire (as it contrariwise finally
happened some years or even centuries later with Iones, Cypriots, Egyptians and
others).
2. About two weeks before (the
battle of Marathon) the fall of Eretria occurred along with the
enslavement of its inhabitants too. This development could have feared the
Athenians, but at the same time it acted also as a catalyst for the
determination and the militancy of their soldiers. For
reasons that most probably are due to the capacity (tonnage) of the ships, the
Eretria’s hostages were left by Medeans (guarded) at Styra, an islet towards
Euboea ~ 6 miles to the NE of Marathon.
3. Soon
after the Eretria’s conquest, by the end of summer of 490 BC the Medean
forces landed at the northern edge of the Marathon plain, on the
sandy Schinias beach. A consequence of this access was the approach of the
Persian army to Athens approximately 25 km or 15 miles. The above
sandy beach is about 2 km long, on
which for every 5 meters about 200 ships could be drawn or at most 400 (in the
less probable case that one ship was set side-by-side to the other). The at
least 200 ships remaining were necessarily anchored off the coastline.
Therefore, the offshoot had to proceed partially (e.g. initially from the first
200 ships, afterwards from the other 200, and finally from the remainder).
4. The Athenians reacted
immediately by sending overnight 9,000 soldiers to Marathon, blocking thus
to the Persian invaders the way towards their city. This must have been the
most important military enterprise
that took place before the Battle of Marathon (if not even generally).
Subsequently, the Athenian army was fortified on rocky hills in the SW corner
of the Marathon plain almost to the opposite of the Medeans. This
also very important militarily action cancelled the advantage of the mighty Persian
cavalry as it could not attack against an elevated fortified position. Under
these circumstances, the opposite armies (which initially had a distance of ~
1.5 km) did not risk fighting each other over the next five days. However
it is rumored that the Greeks approached every day a
little, in order to get closer and have the possibility of a sudden attack,
although remaining in a safe distance outside the range of the Medean arrows.
5. At the same time, the Athenians
sent runners to various Hellenic cities with a call for help, but only Plataea
responded to this request, by sending in fact all of its available military forces composed by 1000
hoplites. However they brought the enthusiasm at the Hellenic camp
of Marathon, raising the moral of the Athenian fighters. Sparta, due
to the “Carnea” (rituals in honour of God Apollo), sent military aid only after
the new moon. This resulted to that the 2,000 Lacedaemon soldiers arrived
to Attica only the day after the battle. Such a delay may also be due
to the fact that the Spartans did not sympathize the (“exceedingly more”) democratic Athenians and / or because they did
not want their forces to be placed under the Callimachus military command.
6.
During the night before the battle of Marathon, the biggest
part of the Persian cavalry secretly boarded
(possibly along with some infantry troopers) in order to overcome Cape Sounion and
attack the day after against the almost unguarded Athens. There are also indications that a Medean naval
squadron (of 100 ships?) transporting the aforementioned Persian
military force had already sailed by night against Athens. Thus in the dark it was not easily evident where towards is heading the
squadron (with the exception perhaps to ancient observatories,
called fryctories), neither in
day light that some of the Medean ships were
missing. Therefore at the down this squadron should not be yet very far from Marathon (lets say for example near
to Vravron). This hypothesis is supported by that otherwise, if e.g. part of the Persian fleet had not
yet sailed, the cavalry could disembark immediately and participate to the battle. If again the naval
squadron had reached the Cape Sounion, then would probably continue
to perform on the plan at attacking Athens. Therefore the aforementioned
Medean naval squadron must have had being alerted and hurriedly returned in
order to disembark and to assist the Persian soldiers who had suffered on the
first day light the attack at Marathon. However the Medean strategy may be
characterized as of good inspiration, by remaining on one hand most of the Persian
army at Schinias bay keeping busy and practically not allowing to
their adversary to leave Marathon and on the other hand to sail with Medean
forces towards the undefended Athens. Obviously the
goal was a relatively easy Persian victory, with the further probable purpose to put the Hellenes in the middle,
i.e. simultaneously from two
places (i.e. from Athens and from
Marathon). Evidently, an eventual occupation of Athens and the
enslavement of its women and children, but also the fear of finding the Greek
allied troops even encircled, it would have disrupted the morale of its
hoplites, being this also a part of the Persian strategic plan.
7. Facing the above new developed situation, the Commander-in-Chief Callimachus (with this
memorable name) along with his ten generals decided at a night military council
not to wait for the Spartan aid as close as it might be, but the allied
Athenians with the Plataeans to attack at dawn, exactly because most of the
fearsome Persian cavalry was missing (the presence of which in battle is
however not mentioned by Herodotus, reconfirming that Medean horses were not
anymore present at Marathon battlefield). The news for the departure of the
cavalry was transferred from Ions which were obliged to participate in the
campaign with the Persians against Greece (cf. the "Souida"
dictionary). Obviously, the Athenians would have sent spies to check the
relevant information, or else the following morning is not likely any attack to
be attempted.
NB: In the past five days it is
possible that the ten generals disagreed among them as concerns the necessity
or not of a battle with the Medeans. Such discussions could even be made
publicly in order to reach the Persian ears with the purpose to deceive them
(that they allegedly were determined to attack, defying even the Persian
cavalry). Consequently, due also to the fact that it had not yet completely
extinguished the danger from the Eastern Empire during the middle of the Golden
Age, what is referred by the Greek historian from Halicarnassus, that five
generals have agreed and five disagreed before the engagement with Medeans at
Marathon, must not co respond to the truth, since after the withdrawal of the
Persian cavalry, there was no other choice but to have the Greek attack
proceeded without any further delay. In fact it was decided that the co
respective clash should
take place without even expecting the Peloponnesian aids that were en route and
anymore near Attica. Furthermore the Persians obviously kept in mind
what was happening in the past five days, i.e. without any battle concluded,
were surprised by the Greek racing so they could not even successfully use
their terrible archers. On the contrary if the sudden Greek attack did not take place and the
Battle of Marathon was not given that particular morning, then the Medeans
might have conquered Athens and afterwards encircle the
Greek forces at Marathon. The
absence of the Persian cavalry, the neutralization of the Medean archers, as
well as the better armament of the Greek Marathon fighters were the
factors that almost certainly would grant to the Greeks the victory. Therefore the Hellenic attack ordered by Callimachus did
not represent a despair effort (in a meaning: "all for all") as one
might assume, but the only chance to conclude a battle with a successful for
the Greeks outcome. In any case, the Hellenic forces were obliged to first win
and neutralize the Persian army that was in front of them at Marathon and then
(since there was time - obviously not a lot) run to the
Athens’ seaport Faliron to face the invaders again there
too (as it finally happened).
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ: Μαραθων, Μαχη Μαραθωνος
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